Treasury Advances Economic Fury With Expanded Sanctions on Iranian Oil Smuggling and Hizballah Gold Financing Networks

On April 15, 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) announced a major sanctions action carried out under its “Economic Fury” campaign, targeting illicit Iranian oil transportation networks and Hizballah‑linked financing schemes. The action designates more than two dozen individuals, entities, and vessels connected to Iranian regime elites, oil smuggling, and terrorist financing.

Following OFAC’s press release, the measures are intended to disrupt revenue streams supporting Iran’s government and its regional proxies, including Hizballah, and build on earlier designations issued as part of the U.S. government’s maximum economic pressure strategy.

Targeted Oil Shipping Network
The sanctions primarily focus on a global oil transportation and sales network led by Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani (“Shamkhani”), whom OFAC identifies as the head of a multi‑billion‑dollar Iranian and Russian petroleum sales operation. As detailed in the report, Shamkhani is the son of Ali Shamkhani, a now‑deceased senior Iranian security official. As detailed in the report, OFAC stated that the network generates significant revenue for the Iranian regime through the sale and transportation of crude oil, refined petroleum products, and liquefied petroleum gas.

OFAC also reported that the Shamkhani network relies on a web of front companies, many operating as seemingly legitimate administrative, consulting, shipping, and logistics firms, to manage vessels and evade U.S. sanctions. Numerous UAE‑based firms, along with related international subsidiaries and individuals, were designated for materially assisting, being owned or controlled by, or acting on behalf of Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani. For more information and a list of all designated parties, please refer to this OFAC SDN List update.

Continued Targeting of the Shadow Fleet
As part of the Economic Fury action, OFAC designated multiple shipping companies and identified several vessels as blocked property. OFAC stated that these vessels have transported millions of barrels of Iranian and Russian oil or petroleum products, generating billions of dollars for sanctioned regimes. OFAC reported that the fleet relies on a complex web of owners, operators, managers, and ship‑management companies to obscure beneficial ownership and evade sanctions enforcement. The designated companies include entities based in the Marshall Islands, India, Panama, Cameroon, and elsewhere.

The action also builds on OFAC’s July 2025 designation of the Shamkhani network, identified by Treasury as its largest single Iran‑related sanctions action since the resumption of the maximum pressure campaign. See US hits Iranian shipping network with major new sanctions | Reuters. In this April 2026 action, OFAC further identified vessels already associated with previously sanctioned shipping firms and extended designations to additional ship‑management and logistics companies that supported fleet operations, including vessel provisioning, technical management, and procurement. We emphasize that the situation surrounding the Iran conflict has led to a focus on this sector, and there have been numerous developments in recent weeks.

Targeting of Iranian Oil‑for‑Gold Scheme Linked to Hizballah
In a joint investigation with Homeland Security Investigations, OFAC also targeted a separate Iranian oil and gold smuggling operation tied to Hizballah financing. Iranian national Seyed Naiemaei Badroddin Moosavi (“Moosavi”) was designated for providing material support to Hizballah and facilitating oil‑for‑gold transactions involving Iran and the former Venezuelan regime.

Following the release, OFAC stated that Moosavi orchestrated the smuggling of Iranian oil to Venezuela in exchange for gold, which was transferred back to Iran for the benefit of Hizballah and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Qods Force. OFAC further reported that the scheme relied on sanctions‑evasion tactics including ship‑to‑ship transfers, automatic identification system spoofing, and the use of “zombie” tankers. We note that several affiliated companies in the UAE and Europe were designated for supporting or acting on Moosavi’s behalf.

OFAC Designation Implications
As with prior OFAC designations, all property and interests in property of the designated individuals and entities that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. Entities owned 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked under OFAC’s 50% Rule.

All transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or blocked persons are prohibited unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or exempt. These prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person and the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.

We generally advise entities and individuals engaged in shipping, energy, commodities trading, financial services, insurance, logistics, or related sectors to review their counterparty relationships, vessel exposure, and transaction flows for potential sanctions risk. OFAC has emphasized that violations of U.S. sanctions may result in civil or criminal penalties, including on a strict liability basis, and that non‑U.S. persons may also face sanctions exposure for causing or facilitating prohibited transactions or for engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions.